WardenOne · Project document
WardenOne Privacy Policy
Last updated: November 1, 2026
WardenOne is a browser security extension that protects you against phishing, malware downloads, redirect chains, IP grabbers, trackers, token theft, bad certificates, and risky sites. This policy explains exactly what data WardenOne touches, where it stays, and the few cases where information leaves your device.
We wrote this to be honest about scope rather than reassuring. If anything here is unclear, contact us (see Contact below).
The short version
- WardenOne has no servers of its own and no analytics. It does not track you, does not send us your browsing history, and does not have user accounts.
- By default, no protection sends any outside party information about the pages you visit. Every default-on feature either runs entirely on your device or talks only to hosts the page you are viewing has already contacted itself.
- We never sell, rent, or share your data, and we do not use it for advertising.
- Tracker/service names in Activity and Network Logger come from a bundled local catalog. Name lookups and Refresh names send no browsing hostname to a server. Source opens the pinned public dataset only when you click it.
- Tracker learner also checks unfamiliar URL values for repeated reuse across sites. It keeps at most 256 keyed digests and three hashed site counters per value in worker memory, for at most 30 minutes or until the worker restarts. Raw values, parameter names and visited-site lists are not stored. Activity records only the destination hostname and a suspected-identifier summary, subject to your history controls.
- The learner’s Automatic tracker protection mode (on by default under Learning mode) reads the browser’s own cookie jar for a third-party site it sees on a page, to check whether that site keeps a cross-site, month-long, ID-shaped cookie. The values are judged in worker memory and never stored or sent anywhere; only a yes or no per site is kept, until the worker restarts. The learner then records the same counts described below. Qualifying domains receive durable third-party resource blocks. The check makes no external lookup and automatic learning is disabled in private windows.
- The local learner can also observe hidden text-canvas readback in third-party frames and
read up to eight ID-shaped localStorage values from a loaded third-party frame in an isolated
extension world. Native URL-ID evidence must match an identifying cookie or an observed
storage value. Matching storage/URL identifiers are correlated on three sites within one
browser session using at most 512 salted SHA-256 digests and site sketches in
storage.session. Raw values and full request URLs are never persisted or sent anywhere. Closing the browser or clearing observations removes this correlation; worker suspension preserves it. Canvas observations contain no pixels, text or page-selected script addresses. Review mode requires approval for new blocks. Saved learning-mode choices survive upgrades. - Consent verification reads only the recognized consent manager’s saved cookie after an opt-out action. Cookie values stay out of Activity; it records the manager, action, outcome and evidence type. Pending verification is canceled by pause, disposal or clearing history. Verification adds no external lookup.
- Tracking redirect skipping decodes supported links on your device without asking a link-resolution service or contacting the tracking host. A local extension page briefly holds the original link in its fragment and replaces itself with the destination. Signed or ambiguous wrappers that must continue normally can receive a temporary, tab-scoped permission for that host’s top-level GET navigation, limited to the exact URL when the browser supports its expression. Expiry is scheduled after 30 seconds or on navigation or tab closure. This adds no persistent URL records.
- Privacy signals expose GPC to page scripts and send GPC/DNT headers. Turning the feature off restores the browser’s own preference. Site exceptions follow each document’s hostname, including embedded documents.
- The only times data leaves your device are: (1) downloading public block-lists to keep protection current, (2) a browser-release check when you open the popup: Update Guardian asks Brave, Google or Microsoft (whichever makes your browser) for its latest Stable version, reusing the answer for up to six hours while the browser stays open (a restart, or Check again, asks afresh); it sends nothing about the pages you visit, and it has no off switch, (3) re-requesting third-party scripts a page has already loaded, so they can be checked for tampering, which is on by default, and it reaches no host the page has not already used, (4) an opt-in password-breach check that uses privacy-preserving k-anonymity, (5) an opt-in login-page age check whose button sends a site’s domain to a public registration-data service, (6) opt-in reputation look-ups that you must switch on yourself, and which, once on, send the addresses of pages you open to the provider automatically, which is why they are off by default and described in full below, (7) a WardenOne build check when the popup opens; GitHub sees the installed public build ID only if a comparison is needed, (8) four things you start by pressing a button (the site breach check, the extension checker, fetching a filter list you added yourself, and the network filtering self-test, which deliberately requests a favicon from named adult and malware-test domains and can therefore show up in DNS or filter logs), and (9) Twitch’s own API, while you are on Twitch, for the ad-blocking and rewind features. Each is described in detail below, and the full list of hosts is there rather than here.
Data stored on your device
WardenOne saves the following in your browser’s local extension storage
(chrome.storage.local). This stays on your computer, is not synced to a cloud
account by WardenOne, and is not uploaded to us:
- Your settings and which protections are enabled.
- A local activity log of what WardenOne blocked or flagged (for the popup and the
Activity/History page). It records security events WardenOne itself acted on, not the pages
you visited. Logged addresses keep the scheme, host and path, but drop the query string and
fragment. Path segments that look like tokens or long identifiers are replaced with
*. Every segment after a sensitive route such asreset,verify,invite,magic,login,auth,oauthorssois redacted regardless of its shape. Nested event details are sanitized within depth, field and size limits; content beyond those limits is dropped. Outside sensitive routes, plain lowercase words and numbers of up to four digits may remain, such as a year or a page number. That can still include a name, or a secret that has that shape. The log keeps at most the last 200 events and nothing older than 30 days under normal retention. Settings → Clean-up & backup → Activity and notification history also offers browser-session storage or no saved history. These choices cover Activity and the Notification Centre; live protection and its notices continue. Changing the choice clears both saved histories and their pending journal. Clear history on the Activity page removes both histories through the worker, including pending writes. Site Dashboard counts, explicit site settings and the separately controlled tracker learner are separate datasets. Clear observations also clears tracker observations, Script Drift baselines and site counts, preserving approved blocks and firewall choices. - Warning-page hand-off records, held in memory for as long as they are needed. When WardenOne stops a navigation (a forced redirect, a blocked page, a certificate failure), the warning page has to know the exact address so it can show you where you were going and take you there if you choose to continue. That address is kept in the browser’s session storage (memory only, gone when the browser closes), filed under a random handle that is the only thing the warning page’s own address carries. It is deleted the moment you continue, dropped when the tab closes, and expires after six hours regardless. Continuing past a reputation warning creates a one-use grant for that tab and exact address, identified by a SHA-256 digest. The next navigation consumes it, and an unused grant stops being valid after 60 seconds. It does not exempt the rest of the host. An earlier version put the full address into the warning page’s URL instead, which meant it went into browser history and session restore for as long as the tab lived. It no longer does. The related redirect-chain memory, used to explain a download that arrived through a chain, keeps only counts, the sites crossed and a fingerprint of the final address, not the address itself, for ten minutes.
- Returning from a blocked download ad. WardenOne keeps browser-provided source tab IDs and, when a reported download-ad destination is attempted, the source page address needed by the Back button. Memory-only session storage holds a maximum of 100 records. Records stop being usable after 30 minutes and are pruned when return metadata is next updated. Closing the warning tab, completing the return or closing the browser removes its record. Source addresses are not put into the public warning URL or returned to the warning page.
- Download-review records for the Download Guard: the file name, the grade and its reasons, and the source address in the same form the activity log keeps (scheme, host and a path with token-shaped parts starred, without the query string or fragment), for up to two hours, at most 25 at a time. Chrome’s own download list may retain the full source address. An earlier build kept the full address in these records, signed download links included.
- The startup safety check’s report: for each open tab it flagged, the host and the reason, never the page title, for 24 hours. In a private window the report is kept in memory only and is gone when the window closes; it never reaches the normal profile.
- Two notes the optional “clear it when I leave” controls need, kept for the browser session only: which sites you accepted a cookie banner on, and which sites registered a service worker while you were there, each as a site name and a time, at most 200 of each, dropped after a day and gone when the browser closes. They exist so that the clean-up still runs when you close the tab after Chrome has put WardenOne’s background worker to sleep, which it does inside most visits; an earlier build kept them only in that worker’s memory, so the clean-up quietly did not happen after a sleep. They are never written to lasting storage and are not kept at all while both controls are off.
- A short-lived reputation cache and “learned” risky-domain list, so repeat checks are faster and work offline.
- Two records that touch where you have been, kept as small as their job allows. The tracker learner notices a third-party domain following you around, and to decide whether to suggest a block, or automatically block it when automatic mode has seen it set an identifying cookie (judged in memory as the browser receives it; the value is never kept), it needs to know that the domain appeared on three different sites of yours. WardenOne’s own verified observations can qualify in one browser session; page-only suggestions still need two. That is all it keeps durably: per tracker domain, a count of sites (never their names) and a 128-bit sketch keyed to your install that can only answer “was this site already counted?” (held while the domain is still gathering its three sites and dropped the moment it is proposed or decided), plus a count of sessions, coalesced observations, fixed source categories, and first- and last-seen dates to the day. Valid older 32-bit sketches finish or expire in their original format so migration does not count the same sites again. A wider sketch reduces missed counts and also makes guessed membership more precise for someone who has the profile and its key. Observations expire after 30 days unseen, including ignored suggestions. Learned blocks, explicit unblock choices and per-site settings stay. Which trackers appeared on the site you are looking at, with a count, is kept only for the current browser session and goes when the browser closes, bounded to 40 sites and 12 tracker domains per site. Repeated source signals are coalesced within each day and browser session. The learner keeps up to 600 observations and 10,000 durable decisions, with domain names, first learning dates and the latest block/unblock status available in searchable, paginated history. It keeps no raw request URLs or visited-site URL in that history. Existing decisions are retained when capacity is full; new decisions pause. Browser-observed hosts are checked only against packaged data, with no external DNS lookup or hostname submission. An earlier build kept up to 80 named sites per tracker with hit counts and exact times; the first start of this build folds that into the counts above and the names are gone. The Script Drift check keeps a record per third-party script it has examined, filed under a hash of the script’s address rather than the address itself, and those records expire on their own after 30 days. Neither record is sent anywhere or readable by a website. The install key is stored with the learner, so someone holding a copy of your whole profile could test a site name they already suspect against the sketch; what they cannot do is read a list of your sites out of it. Privacy Cleaner offers independent choices for browser history, WardenOne activity and notifications, tracker observations (your decisions stay), and Script Drift baselines. Turning the learner off stops new observations.
- The installed-extension inventory, change timeline, exact-version review snapshots, and any exact-ID reputation records you deliberately import. The bundled extension reputation database is read from WardenOne’s own package; installed extension IDs are not sent to a reputation server.
- Any API keys you choose to enter for optional reputation providers (stored locally so the extension can authenticate to the provider you enabled).
- The notification history behind the Notification Centre: up to 300 notices, each with a short description, the site it concerned and up to twelve examples of repeats, kept for the retention you choose there (30 days unless you change it, including a no-expiry choice) under normal history mode. Browser-session and no-saved-history choices override that persistence. Its Clear button removes notification history.
- The rules and lists you make yourself: the text you write in My Rules, the filter lists you subscribe to (their addresses and the rules they returned), your per-site firewall choices, the page elements you hid with the element zapper (the site and the element’s selector), and your own blocked-site list. These are yours rather than something WardenOne observed, so nothing expires them; each is removed from the page where you made it, and all of them go when WardenOne is removed. An earlier version of this policy did not list them.
- Site not working? keeps only the host, one selected feature and a 15-minute expiry for an active recovery trial. The worker applies that temporary choice on the host and its subdomains within the same site boundary without changing a lasting site override. It stops applying at expiry or when you press Undo trial; an expired record is pruned on the next recovery change. The panel derives suggestions from existing local Activity data. Its diagnostic preview includes only the host, recent action types and counts, and the trial expiry. The report stays in the popup until you explicitly save a local file; WardenOne does not upload it. It includes no page text, URL path, query, password or screenshot.
Packaged IP-logger and cryptominer loading can keep two small recovery records in session storage. They contain a retry count, loading status, retry time and failed source category, with no visited sites or page content. They clear after recovery, when the feature is off, on full erasure or when the browser closes.
The opt-in Twitch local rewind feature makes short, high-bitrate clips of video and audio already playing in the current tab and keeps up to five minutes in volatile browser memory. The clips are used only for the in-player replay, are never uploaded or saved to disk by WardenOne, and are discarded when the channel, page, or tab closes. To control memory use, the oldest clips may be discarded before five minutes on unusually high- bitrate streams.
Deleting this data: The popup’s Privacy cleaner → What WardenOne saves shows each saved local or session dataset, its approximate size and its oldest known date when the dataset has a timestamp. Reset WardenOne clears local and session storage and WardenOne’s dynamic and session network rules, then restarts the extension to rebuild default protections. You can reset everything, keep basic settings without API keys, or keep basic settings and API keys. Both keep-options remove site exceptions, user-authored rules and learned records. Finish any active Download Shield reviews before erasing so a paused download is not stranded. After a full reset, WardenOne keeps a random internal reset marker and an empty settings-save record. They contain no settings or site data and stop an older private-window save from restoring erased settings. Default settings may be recreated when the extension restarts.
Forget this site now clears that website’s browser data and permissions; it is not an erase of all WardenOne records about the site. Clean browser data clears the selected browser/site data and the specific WardenOne history records named by that control. Removing WardenOne from Chrome also removes the extension’s storage. Clear records for this site removes matching site records and site exceptions from extension storage. Shared reputation caches, tracker learning and Script Drift baselines are cleared in full because their derived keys cannot be reliably attributed to one site. Other sites’ durable records and global switches are kept, including downloaded public protection lists; restarting WardenOne may clear temporary session records for other sites. It also rebuilds WardenOne’s network rules; it does not clear website cookies or browser history.
When information leaves your device
1. Block-list updates (on when a blocking feature is on)
To keep ad/tracker/malware/phishing blocking current, WardenOne periodically downloads public filter lists from their maintainers. These are ordinary downloads of rule files, and your browsing history is not sent; the list host only sees the normal network request (including your IP address, as with any website you load). No personal data is attached.
Those downloads reach eight hosts, and this is all of them:
raw.githubusercontent.com, easylist.to,
easylist-downloads.adblockplus.org, phishing.army, malware-filter.gitlab.io,
pgl.yoyo.org, ublockorigin.github.io and threatview.io. An earlier version of this policy named four
of them behind a “for example”, which is not a disclosure. Every individual list, its
maintainer and its exact URL are published in
docs/source-inventory.json, which is generated from the
list constants in the code rather than written by hand, so it cannot quietly fall behind
what WardenOne actually fetches.
Third-party maintainers retain ownership and credit. Published licenses and scoped written permissions are recorded separately in that inventory. Attribution and license texts are included in the extension’s Settings → About → Licenses & credits page and in CREDITS.md. The source review identifies specific upstream scope exceptions; public availability alone is not treated as permission to redistribute a feed. These notices add no background requests.
While Download Guard is on, two of those lists are its own: URLhaus’s exact malware
payload addresses (from malware-filter.gitlab.io) and SHA-256 hashes of known malware
samples (from raw.githubusercontent.com). They are stored as fingerprints and compared on
your device; nothing about your downloads is sent for them. Once the hash list is loaded,
Download Guard may download a risky file it is already reviewing a second time, up to
50 MB, from the same address and without cookies, to hash it locally. That site therefore
sees a second request from your IP address. The hash stays on your device unless you
also turned on the VirusTotal hash lookup described below.
1b. Browser release check (when you open the popup)
Update Guardian asks your browser maker for its current public Stable release when you
open the popup or press Check again. Brave uses versions.brave.com and
brave.com, with Brave’s official release metadata on api.github.com as a fallback
when the notes do not identify the release’s Chromium version; Chrome uses versionhistory.googleapis.com; Edge uses
edgeupdates.microsoft.com. Only the source for your detected browser is contacted.
These requests carry no browsing history, page address, or WardenOne settings and use
no cookies; the source hosts still see ordinary requests from your IP address. Results
are kept in temporary extension storage for up to six hours. That storage is cleared when
the browser closes or WardenOne is reloaded or updated, so the first popup after a restart
asks again even if six hours have not passed. If the check fails, WardenOne does not guess
that your browser is current.
1c. WardenOne build check (when you open the popup)
Official GitHub ZIPs carry the full public source commit. When you open the popup,
WardenOne asks api.github.com for this project’s latest published release. If its
commit differs from your installed build, WardenOne asks GitHub whether that installed
commit is an ancestor of the release commit. That second request includes both public
commit IDs in its address. No browsing history, page address, settings, account, or
cookies are sent. GitHub still sees a normal request from your IP address. The result
is kept in temporary extension storage for up to six hours, or ten minutes when the
check fails. Check again in Settings → About WardenOne bypasses the cache.
The check does not run for source copies without a packaged build ID or Store packages. It never downloads or installs code. It only shows an update notice when GitHub confirms the installed commit is older; network errors and unrelated commit histories do not become update claims.
2. Script tamper check: “Script Drift Guard” (on by default)
Pages routinely load scripts from other companies, and one of the commonest ways a trusted site starts attacking its visitors is that one of those scripts is quietly swapped. To notice that, WardenOne re-requests third-party scripts the page has already loaded, hashes them, and compares the hash with what it saw before.
The important detail for your privacy: every one of those requests goes to a host the page itself just used, so no company learns anything it did not already know from you loading the page. Scripts served by the site you are visiting are skipped entirely, nothing about the request is sent anywhere else, and the hashing and comparison happen on your device. Re-checks are rate-limited and capped per page, and allowlisted sites are skipped. Turn it off with Script drift guard in the popup.
EyeShield (off by default) used to make the same kind of request for a different reason: to recolour a page it needs the text of stylesheets the page loaded from other hosts, which a content script cannot read across origins, so the worker re-requested them. It no longer does. EyeShield now asks for that text from inside the page itself, the way the page’s own scripts would: without credentials, and subject to the same cross-origin and private-network rules the browser applies to the page. So WardenOne’s own permissions are never used to fetch an address a page chose, and a host that does not let pages read its stylesheets simply keeps its own colours. The stylesheet text goes nowhere but that tab. Earlier versions of this policy did not mention the request at all.
What it keeps, exactly. For each third-party script it has checked, WardenOne stores a record describing the script: its content hash, its size in bytes, the behaviour indicators found in it, the outbound hosts written inside it, how many times it has changed, and when it was last seen and last checked. The record is filed under a hash of the script’s address rather than the address itself, so the stored file is not a readable list of what your browser has fetched. Records are dropped after 30 days without being seen, and at most 700 are kept.
What it does not keep: which of your sites a script appeared on. An earlier version recorded up to eight first-party sites per script. Nothing ever read them, but together they amounted to a map of where you had been, so they are gone, and any that an older version already saved are deleted the first time the check runs after updating.
3. Site breach history check (opt-in, off by default, no API key needed)
This checks a website’s own public breach record, not your account, and not any password of yours. It tells you whether the site you are on has been breached in the past, so you can decide how much to trust it with.
Nothing is sent until you click. With Breach & site-history checks enabled, pressing
Check breach history in the popup sends the site’s registrable domain only (example.com,
never the full address, never the page path or query, never anything from the page itself) to
haveibeenpwned.com. Have I Been Pwned will also see your IP address, as it would for any
request your browser makes.
The reply is cached on your device for 12 hours, so revisiting a site does not re-send anything. That cache holds at most 120 domains; the oldest entries are dropped past that. Clearing WardenOne’s data removes it.
3b. Password exposure check (manual, you press the button, no account involved)
Session Shield has a Check password exposure box. Nothing watches what you type into web pages; this only ever sees what you type into that one box, when you press that one button.
An earlier version of this policy described a password lookup that no part of the interface could reach. That dead code was removed rather than wired up, and this section replaces it, documented before the feature ships, as the previous version of this policy promised.
What leaves your device is five hexadecimal characters, and nothing else:
- The password is hashed with SHA-1 on your device.
- The first five characters of that hash are sent to
api.pwnedpasswords.com. - That service returns every hash suffix in that bucket: hundreds of them, for hundreds of thousands of unrelated passwords.
- Your browser compares them locally and finds out whether one is yours.
This is Have I Been Pwned’s k-anonymity range protocol. The service cannot tell which of the returned hashes you were asking about, and cannot reconstruct the password from a five-character prefix. The full password and the full hash never leave the machine.
The request is sent without cookies and without a referrer, and asks for a padded response, so the size of the reply does not narrow down which prefix was requested.
The result is shown on screen and written nowhere: not to history, not to storage, not to the badge. Close the popup and there is no record of it. WardenOne never learns your password, and never learns whether you have one that was breached beyond the moment it tells you.
Your email address is never sent anywhere. The account-search side of Have I Been Pwned needs an authenticated key and transmits the address itself; WardenOne does not use it.
4. Login page age check (opt-in, off by default, no API key needed)
A login form on a domain registered days ago is one of the strongest phishing signals
there is. If you switch this on, a page with a password field offers a Check domain age
button. Only pressing it sends that site’s registrable domain (example.com, never
the full URL, page contents or what you type) to rdap.org, or your enabled
WhoisXML domain-age service. WardenOne uses the returned registration date to assess
the sign-in page. Page scripts cannot start the manual domain-age request through
the MAIN-world message bridge.
This optional check tells an outside party something about where you browse, which is why it is off by default even though it needs no API key and costs nothing. rdap.org sees the domain and your IP address, as any site you load would. Answers are cached on your device (most recent 100 domains) so the same site is not looked up twice; requests for IP addresses and private or local hostnames are never sent at all. Turn it on or off with Login page age check in the popup.
5. Reputation providers and the local OpenPhish feed
WardenOne can optionally check a URL, domain, or file hash against third-party threat
services only if you enable automatic checks or explicitly start a check with your key.
External URL, domain and hash submissions are off by default: Google
Safe Browsing (safebrowsing.googleapis.com), VirusTotal (www.virustotal.com), urlhaus
(urlhaus-api.abuse.ch), AbuseIPDB (api.abuseipdb.com), PhishTank
(checkurl.phishtank.com), and WhoisXML (www.whoisxmlapi.com,
domain-reputation.whoisxmlapi.com, threat-intelligence.whoisxmlapi.com).
Most of those require you to supply your own API key. OpenPhish is the exception and is on by default: it is
used through its free public community feed, which needs no key, and it is fetched as a
whole list from raw.githubusercontent.com rather than by asking about your URL, so no
address of yours is sent to it. An earlier version of this policy said every provider
required a key, which was not true of OpenPhish. Earlier builds also offered an optional
OpenPhish token field; nothing ever read that token, the field no longer exists, and a
token saved by an earlier build is deleted from your settings when WardenOne updates.
Your API key identifies your account with its provider. When automatic checks are on, that provider can join the addresses WardenOne submits to your account across browser sessions, IP address changes and networks. Entering or testing a key alone leaves automatic checks off; you must turn on the provider’s separate switch. A saved key remains available for a right-click check you start yourself while automatic checks are off. Erase the key field to remove it from this device.
Google Safe Browsing requires its API key in the request URL. WhoisXML Domain Reputation and Threat Intelligence also document a query-string API key. Those HTTPS URLs can appear in provider, proxy or debugging logs. WhoisXML’s WHOIS-record endpoint supports a bearer header, which WardenOne uses instead. These provider clients do not copy raw exception or provider-supplied error text into result messages; failed checks use generic text and HTTP status. Restrict the Google key to the Safe Browsing API in Google Cloud, keep provider keys private, and rotate a key if it was copied into a log or shared. The Google Safe Browsing setup guide, WhoisXML Domain Reputation request guide and Threat Intelligence request guide describe these authentication methods.
Be clear about what switching one on means. Automatic checks run without a per-site button for the whole time their switches stay enabled: some happen as you navigate, others when a download begins. Earlier wording here said “the specific URL/domain/hash being evaluated is sent”, which was true and still left the wrong impression. Precisely:
- Google Safe Browsing and urlhaus receive the address of every page you open, as
scheme, host and path, like
https://example.com/some/page. The query string (everything from?on), the#fragmentand any user name in the address are removed before the request is made. Provider URLs longer than 1,500 characters are skipped rather than shortened into a different address. The path is kept on purpose: a phishing page on a shared host is identified by its path, and a blocklist entry for it is useless without one. That means a secret carried in the path, like the token in a password-reset link, does still travel; one carried in the query does not. Over a browsing session, the list of pages you open is still a substantial part of your history, held by someone else. An earlier version of this policy said the query was sent too, and it was. - PhishTank and WhoisXML are held back during ordinary browsing and only fire when
the address itself looks like a sign-in, payment or redirect page (words like login,
verify, billing, a
@in the host, a cheap risky suffix, a?redirect=parameter; the query is read on your device to make that decision, then removed), or when you explicitly ask about a link. PhishTank and WhoisXML Threat Intelligence then receive the same scheme, host and path; WhoisXML’s domain age and domain reputation checks receive the registrable domain only. An earlier version of this policy said WhoisXML received the domain only, and its threat-intelligence check did not.- The right-click Check this link sends the same form: the address you selected, without its query string. Its result tab identifies the source page and destination; source-page contents are not sent to providers. Report addresses hide query values, fragments and embedded credentials. Reports are held only in worker memory, capped at 20, expire from use after ten minutes, and are cleared by the relevant WardenOne data erase. A worker restart interrupts a report rather than persisting its addresses.
- AbuseIPDB is only consulted when a site is reached by bare IP address, and receives that IP.
- VirusTotal URL reputation receives the address of public HTTP(S) downloads when its switch is on and a key is saved, including downloads that otherwise look clean. The automatic request removes URL credentials, the query string and the fragment; the scheme, host and path remain. Local or private-network addresses, and addresses still longer than 2,000 characters after sanitizing, are skipped.
- VirusTotal URL-content hash lookup has a separate switch. For small risky downloads, WardenOne may re-fetch up to 50 MB from the download address, hash the response locally, and send only that SHA-256 to VirusTotal. It cannot read Chrome’s saved file, so the re-fetched bytes may differ. File contents are not uploaded to VirusTotal.
- The popup’s VirusTotal URL scanner runs only when you press its button. It sends the URL you pasted, including any query string, fragment or credentials embedded in it, using your saved key. Its automatic switch can remain off. Remove private tokens before using this scanner; local and private-network addresses are refused.
- File Shield’s VirusTotal button runs only when you press it and sends a SHA-256 hash of the selected local file, never the file or its name.
- No request introduces WardenOne. Beyond the address and your own key, a provider receives
nothing that names the extension or its version, with one exception it demands: Safe
Browsing’s API requires a client name and version in every request, and gets
wardenoneand the installed version. PhishTank lookups used to carry anX-WardenOne-Clientheader with the exact version, which PhishTank never asked for; it no longer does. - OpenPhish receives nothing, as described above.
Navigation reputation answers are cached on your device so the same address is not sent twice, under a
fingerprint of the address rather than the address itself, for between five minutes and
twelve hours depending on the provider and the answer, so the cache is a lookup table and
not a list of where you have been. legal.twitch.tv is the one address excluded
outright. Those providers are independent
data controllers with their own privacy policies; review theirs before enabling. WardenOne
sends nothing to any of them until you do, and every one of them is off until you do.
6. Check an extension before you install it (you press the button)
When you paste an extension’s ID or Web Store link into the extension checker, WardenOne
asks the Chrome Web Store (chromewebstore.google.com) for that listing’s public page,
with no cookies attached, to learn whether the listing still exists and what name it
carries. Everything else about that check is answered from a list bundled inside
WardenOne. Nothing is sent unless you ask for the check, and what is sent is the
extension’s ID, never anything about you.
7. Network filtering self-test (you press the button)
The network test page answers “is something on this network already filtering my browsing?” by trying to load a favicon from a handful of sites and seeing which fail. You have to open that page and start the test; nothing here runs on its own.
Please read this one before using it. To tell what kind of filtering is in place, the
test requests a favicon from two well-known adult sites
(www.pornhub.com, xvideos.com) and one malware test host
(testsafebrowsing.appspot.com), plus two controls to prove the network is up at all
(www.google.com, www.cloudflare.com). Nothing is rendered and no page is opened. But
these are real network requests: they can appear in DNS logs, in your router or your
employer’s or school’s monitoring, and in a family filter’s report: the very systems the
test exists to detect. On a network where that matters to you, do not run it.
8. Twitch requests, on Twitch only
Two Twitch features talk to Twitch’s own API at gql.twitch.tv, and only while you are on
a Twitch page:
- Twitch ad blocking asks for the stream’s playback token the way the player does, so
it can request an ad-free variant of the stream. To be accepted, that request carries
the same
Authorizationheader the Twitch page itself is already using. It’s read from the page, sent only back to Twitch, and never stored or sent anywhere else. Cookies are not attached (credentials: 'omit'). - Twitch rewind asks whether the channel you are watching has an in-progress recording of the live broadcast, so it can open it at the point you joined. That request sends the channel name and no credentials at all.
Twitch already knows you are watching Twitch, which is why this is listed as a request rather than a disclosure of anything new. Both features are described in the popup and both can be turned off there.
9. Filter lists you add yourself (you press the button)
My Rules can subscribe to a filter list at an https:// address you type. WardenOne
fetches it when you add it and again when you press its update button, never on its own,
from exactly the address you gave, without cookies. That list’s host receives an ordinary
request and your IP address, as it would if you opened the address yourself, and nothing
else. Which host that is depends entirely on the address you chose, which is why it is
described here rather than named. An earlier version of this policy left this out.
The same section also offers a list of regional, annoyance, privacy and security filter
lists to pick from, so you do not have to go looking for addresses. That catalogue ships
inside WardenOne as filter-list-catalog.json and is only a list of names and addresses:
reading it contacts nothing. Choosing one is the same user-started subscription described
above, to the host named in that entry, and you can read every address in the file before
choosing. Nothing in the catalogue is subscribed to by default.
That is the complete list of external endpoints WardenOne contacts. The requests above cover public lists, browser and WardenOne build checks, script re-checks, Twitch while you use Twitch, checks you switched on, and actions you started. There is no background telemetry, no crash reporting, no usage analytics, and nothing whatsoever is sent to WardenOne’s developer. There is no WardenOne server to send it to.
Permissions, in plain terms
WardenOne requests broad browser permissions because on-device security requires them. None are used to collect data about you. A per-permission justification is published with the store listing; in summary:
- Read/observe pages and network requests (
declarativeNetRequest,webRequest,webNavigation,scripting,activeTab,<all_urls>): to block malicious requests and detect redirect chains, grabbers, and unsafe navigations, on any site. Network request observation is read-only. - Downloads: to inspect and, when risky, pause/cancel a download (Download Guard).
- Cookies / content settings / browsing data: to power cookie handling, per-site JavaScript/location controls, and the user-initiated “Clean browsing data” and “Forget this site” tools.
- History: used only by “Forget this site” to remove entries for a domain you choose; WardenOne does not continuously read or transmit your history.
- Management: to list installed extension IDs, versions, permissions, install type and enabled state for the local Extension Security Centre. WardenOne compares exact IDs with its bundled on-device incident database and watches meaningful access changes. It cannot read or scan another extension’s source package. It disables or requests Chrome-confirmed removal only when you press that extension’s explicit button; it never installs, disables, or removes another extension automatically.
- Tabs / alarms / notifications / storage: for the toolbar badge, the startup safety check, the Memory Shield (sleeping idle tabs), scheduled list updates, security alerts, and saving your settings locally.
Data we do not collect
WardenOne sends nothing to us. We do not collect your browsing history, page contents, form data, keystrokes, credentials, cookies, location, or any personally identifiable information, and there is no server of ours that could receive them. There is no advertising, no data brokerage, and no third-party tracking introduced by WardenOne.
That is a different statement from “nothing leaves your device”, and the two are kept apart on purpose. By default, nothing about the pages you visit leaves your device. The exceptions are the ones you switch on yourself: an enabled reputation provider is sent the address of every page you open, as scheme, host and path, for as long as it stays on (section 5), and the checks you start by pressing a button (sections 6 to 8).
Chrome Web Store Limited Use
WardenOne’s use and transfer of information received from Google APIs adheres to the Chrome Web Store User Data Policy, including the Limited Use requirements.
Concretely, and in the same terms that policy uses:
- User data is used only to provide or improve the single purpose stated in the listing: protecting the person using the browser.
- User data is not transferred to third parties except where a person has explicitly enabled an optional reputation or breach provider, at which point the request goes to the provider they chose. Those providers are independent data controllers.
- User data is never transferred or used for advertising, ad targeting, personalisation, credit assessment, or lending.
- No human reads user data. There is no server to read it on; nothing is transmitted to the developer at all.
WardenOne uses no Google account sign-in and requests no OAuth scopes. Google Safe Browsing is an optional, off-by-default lookup that a person enables with their own API key.
Children
WardenOne is a general-audience security tool and is not directed at children under 13. It does not knowingly collect any personal information from anyone.
Changes to this policy
If this policy changes materially, we will update the date above and the version published with the store listing. Continued use after an update constitutes acceptance.
Contact
Questions or privacy requests: open an issue on the project’s issue tracker at https://github.com/iri-dev/WardenOne/issues/new/choose
The issue tracker is the support channel for WardenOne. It is public, so please do not post anything you would not want visible; if a privacy request needs private details, say so in the issue and we will arrange another route.
WardenOne is provided as a protective tool and does not guarantee detection of every threat. It supplements, and does not replace, safe browsing habits.